The policy explained how to report but never what counts as a
vulnerability, so any finding phrased as "IPC command X, given parameter
Y, writes a file" arrived as a valid report.
Records the trust boundary as a scoping decision supported by four
checkable facts about the shipped renderer, each with the condition that
would invalidate it. The exemption covers only reports whose sole route
to the IPC surface is DevTools or a locally modified frontend; a chain
starting from a deep link, remote data, an inbound proxy request or an
XSS stays in scope. Trust in the renderer covers the code we ship, not
arbitrary values flowing through it.
Notable corrections to the first draft, from review:
- the app is not free of server components: it runs a local HTTP proxy
whose listen address is user-configurable and may be non-loopback.
Inbound requests to it are now listed as untrusted input
- "no remote content" was already false. The renderer fetches model
pricing JSON and provider avatars, which CSP permits. Narrowed to
remote *executable* content, and the remote data it does fetch is
named and classified as untrusted
- having the same filesystem permissions as the user does not make a
write the user's decision. Confused-deputy cases, where an untrusted
source controls the path or content, are in scope
- user-authored integrations that run commands are out of scope; the
same integrations arriving by import or deep link are not, and the
required property there is informed consent
- being in scope here and meeting GitHub's CVE eligibility criteria
are separate questions, decided by different parties
Add three community health files with bilingual (EN/ZH) support:
- CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md: Contributor Covenant v2.1 with official Chinese translation
- SECURITY.md: security policy pointing to GitHub Security Advisories
- CONTRIBUTING.md: contribution guide with dev setup, code style, PR guidelines,
i18n rules, and AI-assisted contribution policy
Jason